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THE  DIFFERENCE  NARROWS:
A  REPLY  TO  KURT  LASH
Randy E. Barnett* & Evan D. Bernick**
We thank the Notre Dame Law Review for allowing us to respond to Kurt
Lash’s reply to our critique of his interpretation of the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause.  We could forgive readers for having difficulty adjudicating this
dispute.  When Lash argues, evidence always comes pouring forth, and the
sheer volume can overwhelm the senses.  We sometimes have a hard time
following his arguments, and we are experts in the field.  We can only imag-
ine how it seems to those who are otherwise unfamiliar with this terrain.
So, in this reply—with a few exceptions—we will avoid piling up any new
evidence and will instead offer succinct counterpoints to his points.  Above
all, we wish to stress the narrowness of our disagreement—narrowness that is
easily obscured by the presentation of one source after another.  As we did in
our original article, we start with our points of agreement—which Lash
repeatedly characterizes as “concessions.”1
I. WHERE WE AGREE
A. The Accuracy of Our Summary of Lash’s Thesis
We are pleased that, for all his many disagreements with our position,
Lash does not dispute the accuracy of our twenty-two-page summary of his
thesis.  Summarizing his approach was no mean feat.  It required weeks of
poring over his various articles and blog posts, along with his book.  To the
end of getting his views right, we shared an early draft of our paper with him
to offer him a chance to correct us.  He did not offer any corrections then
and does not take issue with our account of his views now.  So, readers can
© 2019 Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions
may reproduce and distribute copies of this reply in any format at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the authors, provides a citation to the
Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory, Georgetown University Law
Center; Director, Georgetown Center for the Constitution.
** Law Clerk to the Honorable Diane S. Sykes, United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit.
1 See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Enumerated-Rights Reading of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause: A Response to Barnett and Bernick, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591, 598 (2019).
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read our opening summary with confidence it accurately reflects all the twists
and turns of Lash’s arguments—including their evolution over time.
It was during this inquiry that we discovered that Lash has on several
occasions fundamentally changed his positions on key issues.  In our critique,
we focused on one issue in particular: how Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment constitutionalized the fundamental rights identified in the Civil
Rights Act of 1866.  Lash has at one time or another claimed that each of the
four working parts of Section 1 constitutionalized the 1866 Act.2  His present
position is that the Act was constitutionalized by the Due Process of Law
Clause (or perhaps a combination of the Due Process of Law Clause and
Equal Protection of the Laws Clause).3
In our critique, we did not fault Lash for changing his views.  To the
contrary, we have changed our views over time on some important issues;4 we
commend Lash for continually seeking to get things right; and we applaud
him for having the intellectual humility to acknowledge what he now believes
to have been interpretive errors (even where we think he was closer to the
mark the first time).
If there is anything to fault in Lash’s presentation of his revised views, it
was in his omission to inform readers that those views were in fact revised and
to explain his reasons for those revisions.  At a minimum, it would have made
it much easier for us to understand his actual claims.  Instead, each new view
is presented as though it is consistent with all that went before.  We are happy
to have dispelled some of the resultant confusion.
We might also fault Lash for his failure to correct his previous dismissal
of the suggestion made by one of us that the Due Process of Law Clause is not
merely a “procedural” guarantee but constrains the content or “substance” of
legislation.  In reply to a piece by Lash in which he caustically criticized a
book by journalist Damon Root,5 Evan Bernick wrote:
The notion that the Due Process of Law Clause protected natural rights
became a thesis that was asserted in the platforms of anti-slavery parties
throughout the antebellum period.  Due process of law clauses in state con-
stitutions had been interpreted to provide natural law protections for prop-
erty rights before the Civil War and the Supreme Court had interpreted
states’ law of the land provisions to protect substantive rights. . . .
2 See Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Privileges or Immunities Clause, Abridged:
A Critique of Kurt Lash on the Fourteenth Amendment, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 499, 505 (2019).
3 Kurt T. Lash, Enforcing the Rights of Due Process: The Original Relationship Between the
Fourteenth Amendment and the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 106 GEO. L.J. 1389, 1459 (2018).
4 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: A Unified Theory
of Originalism, 107 GEO. L.J. 1, 4–5 (2018) (“[S]ome New Originalists—including one of
us—insisted that the usage of the terms ‘originalist’ and ‘originalism’ is properly confined
to the activity of interpretation. . . . We now believe that construction not only can but must
be originalist.”); id. at 5 (“The postulate that constitutional construction is inherently
nonoriginalist is mistaken and has led to unnecessary division among originalists.”).
5 See Kurt T. Lash, Equality and the Civil Rights Act of 1866: A Final Response to Damon
Root, LAW & LIBERTY (July 21, 2015), https://www.lawliberty.org/2015/07/21/equality-and-
the-civil-rights-act-of-1866-a-final-response-to-damon-root/.
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. . . .
Thus, there is reason to believe that, contra Lash, both the Privileges or
Immunities and the Due Process of Law Clauses are properly understood to
protect unenumerated rights.6
To this, Lash responded:
But what about the Due Process Clause?  Even if libertarians are wrong
about the Privileges or Immunities Clause, perhaps the Supreme Court was
right to develop the doctrine of substantive due process.  This is the proposi-
tion of Evan Bernick, whose recent essay at the Huffington Post also takes
issue with my review of Root’s book.
My review did not address the Due Process Clause because not even Damon
Root had the courage to try and resuscitate this broadly mocked doctrine.
That Mr. Bernick now tries to do so provides a telling illustration of the
failure of libertarian constitutionalism.
. . . .
Perhaps now, in the face of overwhelming evidence that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause does not say what they want it to say, libertarians will
embrace their inner Emily Litella, say “never mind,” and quietly return to
Substantive Due Process.7
This was way back in 2015, when Lash was still confident in his opinion that it
was the Equal Protection of the Laws Clause that protected the unenumer-
ated economic liberties of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.8  He offered this opin-
ion just a year after publishing his book, in which he contended that it was
the Citizenship Clause that protected economic liberties.9
We have since presented our theory of the Due Process of Law at
length.10  In our William and Mary Law Review article, we do not embrace the
modern “substantive due process” doctrine that privileges certain rights iden-
tified by judges as “fundamental”—who then apply heightened scrutiny—
while leaving all other liberties protected by “conceivable-basis review.”11  But
6 Evan Bernick, Yes, the Fourteenth Amendment Protects Unenumerated Rights: A Response to
Kurt Lash, HUFFPOST (July 13, 2015), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/yes-the-fourteenth-
amendm_b_7787926.
7 Kurt T. Lash, Root Digs a Deeper Hole: The Equal Protection of Economic Privileges and
Immunities, LAW & LIBERTY (July 15, 2015), https://www.lawliberty.org/2015/07/15/root-
digs-a-deeper-hole-the-equal-protection-of-economic-privileges-and-immunities/.
8 See id. (arguing that “Bingham refused to support the Civil Rights Act because: 1) he
believed Congress needed an amendment granting them power to pass such an act, and 2)
he believed that all persons should enjoy the equal protection of the law, not just citizens”
and stating that “Bingham’s final draft of the Fourteenth Amendment fixed both problems
by including an equal protection clause that protected all persons”).
9 See KURT T. LASH, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNI-
TIES OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 171 (2014) (identifying Citizenship Clause as “the text that
constitutionalized the Civil Rights Act of 1866”).
10 See Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, No Arbitrary Power: An Originalist Theory of
the Due Process of Law, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1599 (2019).
11 See id. at 1647–56.
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we do claim that the Clause protects unenumerated rights, such as those
specified in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.  We are pleased to see that Lash now
joins us in doing so—albeit in a manner he has yet to specify.
B. The Due Process of Law Clause Protects the Natural Rights of Persons
Kurt Lash and we now agree that the Due Process of Law Clause protects
the unenumerated natural rights of all people.  Having presented our theory
of why and how the Clause does so, we now await Lash’s presentation of his
own theory.  In our piece, we maintained that due process of law requires a
judicial assessment of whether a person who stands in jeopardy of his or her
life, liberty, or property is actually guilty of violating the statute—so-called
“procedural due process.”12  It also requires a judicial assessment of the “sub-
stance” of a statute to determine whether the statute was within the power of
the legislature to enact.13
The Due Process of Law Clauses forbid the deprivation of a person’s life,
liberty, or property except through a valid “law.”  This proposition ought to
be less controversial than it is.  Consider what takes place when acts of Con-
gress are found not to be necessary to carry into effect any proper enumer-
ated power, or when statutes violate an enumerated right, such as the
freedom of speech.  In such cases, the “due process of law” requires a judicial
forum in which such challenges can be heard and prohibits such acts—for we
cannot call them laws14—from being used to deprive people of life, liberty,
or property.  Likewise, legislation that is not directed at an end that is prop-
erly within the reserved police power of states is an arbitrary act and not truly
a law that can be used to deprive people—including noncitizens—of life,
liberty, or property.15
In our article, we proposed that, to be valid, state laws actually be shown
to be rationally related to a purpose that is properly within the “legislative” or
police power of states.  And we present a theory of the police power that is
based on protecting the rights of individual members of the general public.
This may sound like ordinary “rational basis review,” and it is how rationality
review was traditionally conceived.16  However, it is not the conceivable basis
review that courts have sometimes employed since the 1955 case of William-
son v. Lee Optical.17
12 See id. at 1660–61.
13 Id. at 1630 (emphasis omitted).
14 See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (“An ACT of the Legislature (for I
cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be
considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority.” (emphasis omitted)).
15 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 10, at 1655.
16 Id. at 1650–54.
17 See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955) (“[T]he
law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional.  It is
enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the
particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”) (emphasis added)).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-2\NDL203.txt unknown Seq: 5  7-JAN-20 14:40
2019] reply  to  lash 683
With this approach to the due process of law, the gap between the pro-
tection afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment to “citizens” by the Privileges
or Immunities Clause, and that afforded to all “persons” by the Due Process
of Law Clause narrows.  We do not expect Kurt Lash to agree with our
approach to implementing the Due Process of Law Clause.  We anticipate he
will limit the scope of judicial review to determining whether a state law is
discriminatory—which we understand to be necessary but insufficient to
assess whether a state law is unconstitutionally arbitrary.  But hope springs
eternal, and our newfound agreement about the Due Process of Law Clause
is significant for at least two reasons.
First, even if Lash disagrees with us regarding how the Due Process of
Law Clause protects natural rights to life, liberty, and property, as we expect,
his view that it does protect natural rights reduces the significance of our disa-
greement about the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  At issue with the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause is any additional rights that citizens alone are
constitutionally entitled to enjoy.  (With respect to both clauses, we think civil
rights—that is, the legally protected natural rights—are to be protected
absolutely.)
Second, our debate would then shift to the original meaning of the
text—“the letter”—of the Due Process of Law Clauses in the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments and how they best should be implemented consistent
with their original “spirit” or function.  This would be an entirely separate
debate from the one in which we are engaged here.  In sum, the fact that
Lash now maintains that unenumerated natural rights are protected by the
“enumerated” Due Process of Law Clause reduces our disagreement with
respect to natural rights to one over how, not whether, these rights are pro-
tected by the Clause.
Further, because the Due Process of Law Clause is, first and foremost, a
right to a judicial forum, some judicial protection of the privileges and
immunities specified in Corfield18 and in the Civil Rights Act is warranted by
the original meaning of the Due Process of Law Clause.  A legislative act that
deprived citizens of any of the privileges and immunities of citizenship would
not be a “law” and thus could not be used to deprive anyone of life, liberty, or
property without violating the Due Process of Law Clause.
With respect to that debate over the scope of protection afforded by “the
due process of law,” every source Lash quotes in his reply to us in support of
his view that the Due Process of Law Clause was thought to protect the rights
identified in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 also supports our reading of this
Clause.  And any such judicial inquiry—even if limited to whether a statute
unjustly discriminates—would require an examination of the substance of the
statute, not merely the procedures by which the statute was enacted.  On this,
there is a growing originalist consensus that we described in our Article.19
18 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
19 See, e.g., Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Essay, Due Process as Separa-
tion of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1677–79 (2012); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist
Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth
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So, after initially asserting that the rights contained in the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 were protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause, then by
the Citizenship Clause, and then by the Equal Protection of the Laws Clause,
Lash’s settlement, at least for now and at least in part, on the Due Process of
Law Clause is significant and welcome.20
C. The Fourteenth Amendment Protects the Fundamental Rights Enumerated
in the First Eight Amendments
Another area of agreement is a very big deal: we share with Lash the view
that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the rights enumerated in the first
eight amendments to the Constitution, which along with the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments are today referred to as “the Bill of Rights.”  We rou-
tinely come across people—typically political conservatives—who deny what
is called the “incorporation doctrine.”  We are pleased to stand shoulder to
shoulder with the formidable Kurt Lash in affirming that these rights are
indeed protected from state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment.
And we also stand with Lash in affirming that enumerated rights are
properly protected as “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States,”21 and not as “incorporated” against the states through the Due Pro-
cess of Law Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  All that remains at issue is
the constitutional status of unenumerated rights, say the right of family mem-
bers to live together,22 the right to raise one’s own children,23 the right to
associate with others,24 or the right to marry25—none of which are specifi-
cally enumerated anywhere in the Constitution.
D. Possible Agreement on “Enumerated Rights”
Another area of possible agreement will come as a surprise to readers.
We might actually agree with Lash’s thesis that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause is limited to “enumerated rights”—as he sometimes uses the term.
We say “possible agreement” because Lash and we may not be using the
phrase “enumerated rights” in the same way.
Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585, 595–96 (2009); Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substan-
tive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 505–06 (2010).
20 See Lash, supra note 1, at 655 (“As for legislation like the Civil Rights Act, which
prohibited racially discriminatory ‘codes,’ such legislation would be authorized by the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses in combination with Section 5.” (emphasis added)); id.
at 658 (“As far as the Civil Rights Act was concerned, they would know that the Joint Com-
mittee believed that the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses prohibited racially discrim-
inatory ‘codes’ and that Section 5 of the Amendment authorized federal legislation
prohibiting such codes.” (emphasis added)).
21 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
22 See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505–06 (1977) (plurality opinion).
23 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63
(2000) (plurality opinion).
24 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958).
25 See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
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Lash’s use of the phrase “enumerated rights” continually shifts through-
out his writings and within his reply.  Sometimes he uses the phrase to
describe textually specified rights, such as the right of “freedom of speech.”26
We continue to disagree that only such rights are protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment.  At other times, however, he uses “enumerated rights”
far more broadly to refer to the protection of rights that is “authorized” by
something in the text.27  We can agree that the Fourteenth Amendment
secures rights, the protection of which is authorized by the text, even if those
rights do not appear in the text in itemized form.
We have already seen an example of this in Lash’s insistence that the
enumerated right to due process of law (either alone or in combination with
the Equal Protection of the Laws Clause) authorizes the protection of what
we would describe as unenumerated natural rights that are specified in the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 but that are not in the text of the Constitution itself.
As just explained, we agree that the Due Process of Law Clause authorizes
such protection (while we may disagree about how and perhaps also why).
But this is not the only place where Lash claims that apparently unenumer-
ated rights are in fact enumerated because there is some textual hook upon
which they can be hung.
Lash also suggests that the courts might be authorized by the Guarantee
Clause to protect a right to vote in some circumstances, a right that he
includes in the set of “enumerated rights” protected by the Privileges or
Immunities Clause.28  The Guarantee Clause reads: “The United States shall
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government . . . .”29
This does not much look like an individual right, privilege, or immunity
to us.  Nevertheless, Lash claims that John Bingham “believed there were enu-
merated texts like the Republican Guarantee Clause that, on certain occasions,
gave rise to congressional authority to regulate voting in the states.”30  He
continues: “[T]he enumerated-rights understanding of . . . [t]hese rights [of
citizenship] include not only those in the 1791 amendments but all enumer-
ated rights, including those enumerated in the Republican Guarantee Clause
and the provisions enumerating the processes of congressional representation.”31
And he maintains this notwithstanding that the right to vote itself is not
enumerated.
We can play this language game, too.  If there is an enumerated right to
vote because of the Guarantee Clause’s provision for “Republican . . . Gov-
ernment,” there are also enumerated rights to marry, have children, live
together with members of one’s own family, etc., because all of these rights
26 E.g., Lash, supra note 1, at 659.
27 Id. at 649.
28 See id. (“Bingham believed that there were enumerated rights that, in certain circum-
stances, authorized federal enforcement of the right to vote.”).
29 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
30 Lash, supra note 1, at 650 (emphasis omitted and emphases added).
31 Id. (emphases added).
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are “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”  Put another
way, if the courts and Congress are authorized to protect the right to vote by
the “enumerated text” of the Guarantee Clause, so too may they be author-
ized to protect the rights to marry, have children, live together with members
of one’s own family, etc., by the “enumerated text” of the Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause.
Assuming Lash is right about the Guarantee Clause, in both cases, the
constitutional text denotes a concept that was associated at the time of ratifi-
cation with a variety of referents that are not textually specified.  Lash would
presumably deny that the rights we have listed are among the “privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States,” but he could hardly deny that, if
indeed they were, they would be just as “enumerated” as the right to vote he
derives from the Guarantee Clause.
For our part, we are agnostic, if not skeptical, that the Guarantee Clause
protects an individual right of the sort that is protected as a privilege or
immunity of citizenship.  But we offer this as an example of how Lash
includes textual authorization of the protection of a right not expressed in the
text as part of his “enumerated-rights” thesis.
He makes this move a lot—especially when discussing how proponents
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 claimed they were “authorized” to enact the
statute by the right enumerated in the Due Process of Law Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.32  At the same time, he disparages claims that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause protects “unenumerated” rights like the right to con-
tract—even though the latter is listed in the 1866 Act.33  In passages such as
these, Lash appears to be saying that his “enumerated-rights” thesis includes
the protections of rights that are not specified in the text of the Constitution,
when such protection is authorized by the text.
At one point he writes “[t]o be ‘secured by the Constitution’ is to be
enumerated in the Constitution.”34 When expanded in this way, we can accept
his “enumerated-rights” thesis.  We too look to the text for authorization for
the protection of unenumerated rights.  We contend that the mass of privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States identified by Jacob How-
ard are “secured by the” text of the Privileges or Immunities Clause from
state abridgment.
32 Id. at 638 (“Representative M. Russell Thayer of Pennsylvania, for example, insisted
that the Due Process Clause all by itself authorized legislation like the Civil Rights
Act . . . .”); id. at 644 (“It is possible, for example, that members believed that the Due
Process Clause authorized the 1866 Act’s protections of citizens’ property rights, but also
believed that noncitizens did not have the same due process rights when it came to the purchase
and conveyance of real property.”); id. at 655 (“As for legislation like the Civil Rights Act,
which prohibited racially discriminatory ‘codes,’ such legislation would be authorized by
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses in combination with Section 5.”).
33 See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27; Lash, supra note 1, at 592.
34 Lash, supra note 1, at 656 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866)
(statement of Sen. Howard)).
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Having identified this area of possible agreement, we must again confess
our uncertainty.35  Lash is not at all consistent on what he means by “enu-
meration.”  This happens to be a term that appears in the text of the Consti-
tution itself: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”36  The
standard reading is that this is a reference to the rights that are textually
specified in the foregoing eight amendments and elsewhere in the Constitu-
tion, for example, in Article I, Sections 937 and 10,38 or in Article III, Section
2.39  It does not ordinarily include any and every provision of the text, such as
provisions governing congressional representation.
Lash is, of course, entitled to adopt any meaning of the phrase “enumer-
ated rights” he pleases.  But if he is going to use the phrase in a nonstandard
manner, it is incumbent upon him to define his usage carefully and then
employ it consistently.  Otherwise readers—in which we include ourselves—
will be confused.
There is a potential problem of false advertising.  People are likely to
read Lash’s “enumerated-rights” thesis to be claiming that only enumerated
rights—that is rights that are textually specified—may be “privileges or immu-
nities of citizens of the United States.”  And yet, in responding to our critique
of this thesis, he shifts to the protection of rights which may somehow be
“authorized” by something “enumerated” somewhere in the text.  We doubt
that most readers will notice the shift.  If they walk away persuaded by the
avalanche of evidence he presents, it is most likely they will (wrongly) believe
he has proven the first not the second claim.
To be fair, it is possible that it is Lash’s sources and not Lash himself who
are confused by this.  But we doubt this.  We suspect that Lash starts with a
thesis that only “enumerated rights” are privileges or immunities of U.S. citi-
zenship.  Then, when pressed to explain his sources, he sees “enumerated
rights” whenever a “provision” of the text is being invoked by his sources for
authorization.
Our exchange with Lash will not end our scholarly debate over the origi-
nal meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  Lash is nothing if not
indefatigable.  He will have ample opportunities in the future to clarify what
it is exactly he is claiming and we encourage him to do so.
35 We hope that this is a merely verbal dispute rather than a substantive disagree-
ment—that Lash and we can agree about the meaning of the phrase “enumerated rights”
even if we disagree about its extension (whether particular rights are in fact enumerated).
See generally David J. Chalmers, Verbal Disputes, 120 PHIL. REV. 515 (2011).
36 U.S. CONST. amend. IX (emphasis added).
37 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”).
38 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No state shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obliga-
tion of Contracts . . . .”).
39 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeach-
ment; shall be by Jury . . . .”).
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II. WHERE WE STILL DISAGREE
Of course, there is one remaining area where we still disagree with Kurt
Lash: we think the evidence shows that citizens of the United States have
“privileges or immunities” beyond those enumerated in what we today call
the Bill of Rights, or elsewhere in the text.  We believe that the express text of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause—“No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge . . . .”—together with the text of Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment authorizes Congress and the judiciary to protect
unenumerated “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”
We are unpersuaded by his rebuttal.  We cannot reiterate all the evidence we
presented.  About the evidence he attempts to rebut we will simply say the
following.
A. Republicans’ Understanding of Article IV
We claimed in our critique that antislavery Republicans developed an
absolute-rights understanding of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, Section 2 over the course of the antebellum period.  Lash
responds that “[t]here is no evidence, however, that any such transformation
occurred at any point during the antebellum period.  In fact, antislavery
Republicans were deeply committed to the idea that the Comity Clause pro-
vided nothing more than equal access to a limited set of state-secured
rights.”40
Lash is wrong.  While the weight of judicial authority supported the com-
ity-only reading of Article IV, Section 2, we cite some judicial authority to
support the Republicans’ differing understanding.  Lash takes issue with our
reading of three of these cases but fails to mention the 1844 decision of Ohio
Judge Nathaniel Reed, who held that the Privileges and Immunities Clause
was designed “not to secure to the non-resident the same rights and indul-
gence with the resident in every State, but simply to secure to the citizen of
the United States, whether a State resident or not, the full enjoyment of all
the rights of citizenship, in every State throughout the Union.”41  Judge Reed
then employs the “ellipsis” reading of the Clause years before it was asserted
by his fellow Ohioan John Bingham.42  Without some affirmative evidence,
we decline to attribute Bingham’s use of this argument to his having gotten it
from his fellow Ohioan, though it would be a reasonable hypothesis.
In his reply, Lash stresses that antislavery constitutionalist Joel Tiffany
cited only enumerated rights as privileges or immunities of citizens that are
protected by Article IV in his 1849 book, A Treatise on the Unconstitutionality of
40 Lash, supra note 1, at 598.
41 Wm. H. Williams, The Arrest of Non-Residents for Debt.—Constitutionality of the Law., 2
W.L.J. 265, 267 (1845).
42 See id. at 266 (“That ‘the citizens (of the United States) of each State,’ or belonging
to each State, ‘shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens (of the
United States) in the several States.’”).
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American Slavery.43  Indeed, Tiffany’s interpretation does sound a lot like
Lash’s interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  But Tiffany
attributes this meaning to Article IV, Section 2, which Lash claims was unre-
lated to the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.44  In the quoted passage, Tiffany rejects the comity-only
reading of Article IV, Section 2 that had prevailed in the courts, as Lash cor-
rectly reports.45  Evidently the absolute-rights understanding of what Lash
insists upon calling the “Comity Clause” was not idiosyncratic after all.
Such sentiments continued to build among antislavery constitutionalists
and affected the constitutional stance of the antislavery Republican Party.  In
our critique, we quote John Bingham’s friend and mentor,46 Joshua Gid-
dings’s proposed resolution at the National Republican Convention in May
of 1860:
That we deeply sympathize with those men who have been driven, some
from their native states and others from the states of their adoption, and are
now exiled from their homes on account of their opinions; and we hold the
Democratic party responsible for this gross violation of that clause of the Con-
stitution which declares that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privi-
leges and immunities of citizens in the several states.47
This was not merely the opinion of one “radical” Republican.  At its con-
vention, the party unanimously adopted Giddings’s resolution,48 which “for-
mally endorsed an absolute-rights reading of the Clause, and one that would
protect citizens even in their own state.”49  Lash doesn’t address this resolution,
which contradicts his strident claim that “[i]t was essential to [antislavery
Republicans’] constitutional theory that Article IV, Section 2 be understood
as providing nothing other than the relative rights of sojourning citizens.”50  By
1860, at least, this claim is clearly wrong.
In his reply, Lash notes Republican Giles Hotchkiss’s response to Bing-
ham’s proposal to protect Article IV privileges and immunities: “Hotchkiss
did not oppose enforcing the rights of Article IV, rights that Hotchkiss
described as ‘provid[ing] that no State shall discriminate between its citizens
43 Lash, supra note 1, at 607–08.
44 Id. at 596 (claiming that “antebellum historical evidence reveals the existence of an
altogether different category of rights, privileges, and immunities [from those protected by
Article IV]—those belonging to ‘citizens of the United States’”).
45 Id. at 607–08.
46 GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, AMERICAN FOUNDING SON: JOHN BINGHAM AND THE INVEN-
TION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 42 (2013) (describing how Giddings took Bingham
“under his wing” and “was his closest professional confidant”).
47 PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST THREE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTIONS 165 (Minne-
apolis, Charles W. Johnson 1893) (emphasis added).
48 John Hutchins, Reminiscences of the Thirty-Sixth and Thirty-Seventh Congresses: XII, 12
MAG. W. HIST. 63, 69 (1890).
49 David R. Upham, The Meanings of the “Privileges and Immunities of Citizens” on the Eve of
the Civil War, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1117, 1153 (2016).
50 Lash, supra note 1, at 596.
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and give one class of citizens greater rights than it confers upon another.’”51
Lash employs this quote to stress Hotchkiss’s nondiscrimination reading of
Article IV.  He apparently missed the fact that, by reading Article IV as bar-
ring discrimination “between its citizens,” Hotchkiss is rejecting the comity-
only reading of Article IV that Lash insists was so essential to antislavery
Republicans.
B. Jacob Howard’s 1866 Speech
Lash moves heaven and earth to explain away the conventional scholarly
interpretation of Jacob Howard’s speech.  He goes so far as to draw attention
to the fact that Howard was a substitute sponsor of the Amendment who did
not support it in committee, even though Lash provides no evidence of How-
ard’s unreliability.  Few, if any, speeches related to the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause have received more academic attention, and Lash’s reading is
idiosyncratic.  At this point we can do little more that to ask readers to reread
Howard’s speech to see if it sounds like he is referring to two sets of rights:
one set of rights that are to be protected absolutely; and another set that are
to be protected from discrimination only when sojourning within another
state.
At times in his writings, Lash intimates that the Corfield rights listed by
Howard are to be generally protected against discrimination.52  But that is
not his current thesis.  His current thesis is that these rights are only to be
protected against discrimination when sojourning in another state.  Readers can
judge for themselves whether this is the information conveyed by Howard’s
words.  True, we are part of a different linguistic community and our linguis-
tic intuitions may differ from those of Howard’s contemporaries, but Lash
does not identify any contemporary who understood Howard as Lash does.
We pointed out that the notes for Howard’s speech suggest that he was
not originally going to mention enumerated rights at all, but added them
on auxiliary sheets 2a and 2b.53  Assuming page 3 was originally meant
to be read following page 2, Howard was referring to Corfield rights alone
when he wrote: “By the first clause, each state is prohibited from restricting
these fundamental civil rights of citizens, whatever may be their nature or
extent.”54  There is nothing here about “when sojourning in other states,” or
that limits protection to discrimination.  Nor is there anything like that in his
speech as delivered.
It bears emphasizing that Howard refers to Corfield rights as the “funda-
mental civil rights [plural] of citizens.”  Lash’s reading treats Howard’s
51 Id. at 635 (emphasis added) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095
(1866) (statement of Rep. Hotchkiss)).
52 This is the stance he now seems to attribute to the Due Process of Law Clause’s
protection of natural rights.
53 See, e.g., id. at 657 n.337 (referring to the “equal protection rights of Article IV”).
54 See Notes of Jacob Howard on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause (1866) [hereinafter Notes of Jacob Howard], http://www.tifis.org/sources/
Howard.pdf [http://perma.cc/V6HA-X2YK].
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speech as identifying a single civil right of U.S. citizens: the right to be free
from discrimination when sojourning in another state.  This point is likely to
be lost in all the verbiage, but we cannot stress it too much.  “Civil rights” is
not the same as “civil right.”
In a footnote, Lash responds: “If . . . Howard originally considered nam-
ing only the equal protection rights of Article IV as ‘privileges or immuni-
ties,’ then this might reflect Howard’s personal preference for such a limited
clause (as reflected in his votes in the Joint Committee).”55  Notice Lash’s use
of the phrase “the equal protection rights.”  Those are Lash’s words, not
Howard’s, who says nothing of the kind.
Nor does Howard’s explanation track the nondiscrimination language
he favored in committee.  In committee, Howard proposed the following:
“No discrimination shall be made by any state, nor by the United States, as to
the civil rights of persons because of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.”56  While this proposal only protected these rights against discrimi-
nation, not absolutely, it would have protected all these “civil rights” of citi-
zens from discrimination by their own states.  (And in his notes for his speech
he identifies Corfield rights as “these fundamental civil rights.”)57
This isn’t Lash’s thesis, and it isn’t the meaning he attributes to How-
ard’s speech.  Again, Lash claims that Howard is referring only to a single
civil right of sojourners to be free of discrimination when traveling in another
state; Howard is not referring to the right of all citizens to be protected
against discrimination by their own states.
In our view, Howard’s words carry a broader meaning.  They did not
convey only the “equal protection of rights” within a state; nor did they con-
vey only the right of sojourners to be free from discrimination with respect to
these rights when traveling in another state.  Instead, they conveyed the
meaning Howard’s notes shows he intended to convey: “[E]ach state is pro-
hibited from restricting these fundamental civil rights of citizens, whatever
may be their nature or extent.”58
Lash’s only other responses are denial (“Nothing about these handwrit-
ten notes, however, supports a fundamental-rights reading”)59 and rank spec-
ulation (“they seem to indicate that Howard received some last-minute
pressure, perhaps from his committee colleague John Bingham, to say some-
thing about protecting the Bill of Rights—Bingham’s major purpose for the
Clause”).60  Lash’s denial is unjustified.  Howard’s notes clearly support the
conventional interpretation of Howard’s speech as affirming the existence of
one mass of fundamental privileges or immunities of citizens drawn from two
textual sources in the Constitution: Article IV and the first eight amend-
55 Lash, supra note 1, at 657 n.337.
56 BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECON-
STRUCTION 83 (1914).
57 Howard, supra note 54, at 3.
58 Id.
59 Lash, supra note 1, at 657 n.337.
60 Id.
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ments.  It is conceivable that Howard was misunderstood by his audience, but
in view of the consistency between his notes and the natural reading of his
words, and the lack of any evidence that the public understood him as Lash
does, we do not think it is plausible.
It is worth noting as well that Howard does not endorse Lash’s current
view that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects any and all enumer-
ated rights that are found outside the first eight amendments.  There is no men-
tion, for instance, of any qualified right to vote derived from the Guarantee
Clause.  And neither does Lash’s favorite source in Lash’s favorite speech.
C. John Bingham’s 1871 Speech
In his reply, Lash goes to great lengths to disparage postratification evi-
dence.  “All postratification evidence is necessarily weak as a source of origi-
nal understanding.”61  And this: “All postratification ‘evidence’ is
problematic as a source of original ratifier understanding . . . .”62  In our
Article, we too qualified the probative value of such evidence: “We do not
offer here a theory of the discount rate that should be used in assessing the
credibility of postratification evidence.”63
But Lash then takes us to task.  “Barnett and Bernick spend much time
discussing postratification evidence—a telling choice that reveals the paucity
of preratification evidence supporting their theory.”64  This is unfair.  Our
choice to discuss postratification evidence is a result of the subject of our
critique spending much time discussing postratification evidence.  As we
wrote:
We are surprised in two respects by the postratification evidence
curated by Lash.  First, we are surprised that Lash interprets this evidence as
being generally consistent with his ERO theory.  Second, we are surprised
that Lash neglects a wealth of other evidence from the same timeframe,
which suggests that the ERO understanding did not take hold.65
It is for this reason we present some of the evidence Lash omits and question
his interpretation of the evidence that he presents.
For a guy who now criticizes harshly the use of postratification evidence,
Lash spends an inordinate amount of time on John Bingham’s 1871 speech
in which Bingham does indeed deny that the privileges or immunities of U.S.
citizens includes Corfield rights.  And he does so again in his reply.  As before,
Lash flatly asserts that Bingham’s speech “is an unambiguous defense of the
enumerated-rights reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and a refu-
tation of the fundamental-rights theory of the Clause.”66
61 Id. at 593.
62 Id. at 643.
63 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 2, at 584.
64 Lash, supra note 1, at 670.
65 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 2, at 575.
66 Lash, supra note 1, at 671.
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We think it is correct to say that Bingham is rejecting the proposition that
Corfield rights are protected absolutely.  “Refuting” connotes successful dis-
proof, and we don’t think Bingham was successful.  But Lash is wrong to
interpret Bingham as defending “the enumerated-rights theory” of the
Clause—at least if Lash is referring to his own “enumerated-rights reading”
of the Clause.
Lash, of course, insists that the Privileges or Immunities of citizens of the
United States includes all and every enumerated personal right—invoking, as
we have seen, even “enumerated provisions” like the Guarantee Clause that
make no reference to personal rights.  But that is not what Bingham said in
1871.  As did Howard in his 1866 speech introducing Section 1 to the Sen-
ate,67 Bingham limits the set of enumerated rights he says are protected to
those in the first eight amendments.
Mr. Speaker, that the scope and meaning of the limitations imposed by
the first section, fourteenth amendment of the Constitution may be more
fully understood, permit me to say that the privileges and immunities of citi-
zens of the United States, as contradistinguished from citizens of a State, are
chiefly defined in the first eight amendments to the Constitution of the United
States.  Those eight amendments are as follows: [quotes the first eight
amendments.]68
In our critique we allow that “chiefly defined” suggests that “first eight
amendments” isn’t exhaustive.69  But if Bingham does not specify exactly
what other privileges or immunities there might be, he certainly does not
articulate Lash’s current theory that they include any and every enumerated
right or provision found elsewhere in the text.  So, while Bingham’s speech
does not support our (and Howard’s) reading of the Clause, it doesn’t sup-
port Lash’s either.
Finally, Lash acknowledges that “[Samuel] Shellabarger had tried to
argue that privileges and immunities protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment were the same as the ‘fundamental’ rights listed by Justice Washington
in Corfield v. Coryell, only now transformed into rights applicable against one’s
own state.”70  This means that Shellabarger adopted our view, and the view of
Jacob Howard, of the scope of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and
rejected Lash’s position in 2019 and whatever was Bingham’s view in 1871.
That is a serious mark against Lash’s claim to have established an original
public meaning to the contrary.
67 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard)
(“Now, sir, here is a mass of privileges, immunities, and rights, some of them secured by
the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution, which I have recited, some by
the first eight amendments of the Constitution . . . .”).
68 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 84 (1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham)
(emphasis added); see also id. (“Jefferson well said of the first eight articles of amendments to
the Constitution of the United States, they constitute the American Bill of Rights.” (empha-
sis added)).
69 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 2, at 576.
70 Lash, supra note 1, at 674.
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D. Omitted Postratification Evidence
While he begins his reply to us with Bingham’s 1871 speech, Lash again
neglects Howard’s 1869 speech in which Howard reiterates the explanation
he gave in 1866:
The occasion of introducing the first section of the fourteenth article of
amendment into that amendment grew out of the fact that there was noth-
ing in the whole Constitution to secure absolutely the citizens of the United
States in the various States against an infringement of their rights and privileges
under the second section of the fourth article of the old Constitution.  That section
declares that—
“The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens of the several States.”71
Once again, Howard makes no reference to protecting the rights of citi-
zens sojourning in another state.  Nor does he limit himself to discrimination
by states or what Lash calls “equal protection rights.”  Instead Howard says
the Clause “secure[s] absolutely” the rights that had been associated with
Article IV, Section 2.  Moreover, in this summary, Howard omits any refer-
ence to the enumerated rights in the first eight amendments, as he did in his
original notes for his 1866 speech before adding pages 2a and 2b.72
Howard’s 1869 summary is entirely consistent with his 1866 speech.  It’s
true that in his 1869 speech he equates the set of privileges or immunities
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment with the set of rights protected by
Article IV, Section 2, and not the first eight amendments.  But in his 1866
speech he identifies the “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States” as including both Corfield rights and the personal guarantees specified
in the first eight amendments.
Howard’s 1869 speech is therefore consistent with the antislavery Repub-
lican position that these sets of rights together comprised the “privileges and
immunities” to which Article IV, Section 2 refers.  In sum: the set of “privi-
leges or immunities” in the Fourteenth Amendment is the same as the set of
“privileges and immunities” in Article IV, Section 2 (the 1869 speech)—and
this set consists of Corfield rights plus those in the first eight amendments (the
1866 speech).
As this is a postratification summary, we do not place great stock in any
of this.  But Howard’s speech flies in the face of Lash’s theory and under-
mines Lash’s reading of Howard’s 1866 speech.  And, for what it is worth,
Howard’s 1869 speech is also closer in time to ratification than Bingham’s
1871 speech and consistent with what Howard said about the Privileges or
Immunities Clause throughout the time period canvassed by Lash and
ourselves.
In contrast, as we have detailed, Bingham’s 1871 speech was unusual.  It
is “the only speech presented by Lash in which one of the framers of the
71 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1003 (1869) (statement of Sen. Howard)
(emphases added).
72 See Howard, supra note 54.
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Fourteenth Amendment clearly denies that Corfield rights are among the priv-
ileges and immunities of national citizenship.”73  It is also inconsistent with
Bingham’s response to Victoria Woodhull’s petition in support of women’s
suffrage—issued just two months previous.74  In that response, Bingham
plainly stated that the set of rights protected by Article IV, Section 2 is identi-
cal to the set of rights protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause.75
Howard’s 1869 speech suffers from no such subsequent problems.
And while in his previous scholarship Lash canvasses materials from the
1870s, he still neglects how heavily Republicans relied on the Privileges and
Immunities Clause in justifying the bill that became the Civil Rights Act of
1875.76  In this bill, Congress protected against racial discrimination in pub-
lic accommodations, common carriers, and places of public amusement.
Only after the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Slaughter-House Cases77 did
many Republicans shift to the Equal Protection of the Laws Clause as a con-
stitutional hook for this particular legislation.78  True, the Civil Rights Act of
1875 was about discrimination, not the absolute protection of these civil
rights.  But Republicans clearly did not hold Lash’s Enumerated Rights Only
reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.79
73 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 2, at 576 (emphasis omitted).
74 S. MISC. DOC. NO. 41-16 (1870).
75 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 2, at 526, 577.
76 Michael McConnell has summarized Republicans’ initial reliance upon, and under-
standing of, the Privileges or Immunities Clause thus:
To the supporters of the civil rights bills during the Reconstruction period, . . .
[t]he Fourteenth Amendment (first by virtue of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, later shifting to the Equal Protection Clause) meant that legally enforcea-
ble civil rights are the same for all citizens (or, after the shift to Equal Protection,
all persons), without distinction on the basis of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude.
Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 993
(1995).
77 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
78 McConnell, supra note 76, at 1002 (“Republican supporters of the civil rights bill
turned to the Equal Protection Clause as a solution to the Slaughter-House problem because
that Clause was not limited to rights of federal citizenship.”).
79 We cannot resist a response to Lash’s charge that we have “fail[ed] to understand”
Frederick Douglass’s views of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Lash, supra note 1, at 668.
Lash appears to think that we are unaware that Douglass opposed the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and championed the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment because he did not
believe that the Fourteenth Amendment conferred the right to vote. Id. at 668–69.  Not
so.  We are just unpersuaded by Lash’s effort to enlist Douglass as a champion of his enu-
merated-rights-only theory.
We pointed out in our critique that in an Atlantic essay highlighted by Lash, Douglass
included (unenumerated) voting rights among the privileges and immunities protected by
Article IV.  Barnett & Bernick, supra note 2, at 574 & n.426–27.  We argued that Douglass’s
denial that there was “any difference between a citizen of a State and a citizen of the
United States” implied that he believed voting rights were among the privileges and immu-
nities of U.S. citizens. Id. (quoting Frederick Douglass, Reconstruction, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Dec. 1866, at 761, 765).  We contended that Douglass opposed the Fourteenth Amend-
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Finally, in insisting on his interpretation of the original public meaning
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Lash never really engages the argu-
ments of the four dissenting Justices in Slaughter-House.  These Justices
insisted that the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States
included the (unenumerated) right to pursue a lawful occupation.80
Though a minority of four, their reading of the historical record negates any
suggestion that “libertarians” are today making things up.
Readers today are entitled to evaluate the originalist reasoning—such as
it is—of Justice Miller’s majority opinion alongside that of the dissenters and
reach their own conclusions.  This is what we do when evaluating Justice
Harlan’s solo dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson.81  And there is a widespread con-
sensus among constitutional scholars of all political stripes—not merely
among “libertarians”—that the dissenters had the better of the originalist
argument.82  Lash is the outlier here, along with a couple others we mention
in our critique.
E. Nonstandard Uses of “the Bill of Rights”
Lash apparently wishes to dispute the modern scholarship by Pauline
Maier, Gerard Magliocca, and Michael Douma showing that the use of the
phrase “the bill of rights” to refer to the first ten amendments did not
become standard until the twentieth century.83  Readers can decide for
themselves whether Lash has the better of this dispute.  This is a relatively
minor point we offered to show that, when mid-eighteenth-century speakers
ment because he believed Section 1’s promise of citizenship was contradicted by Section
2’s implicit denial of voting rights. Id.  Lash does not rebut any of these claims.
Any doubt that Douglass believed that the privileges and immunities of citizenship
encompassed unenumerated rights ought to be dispelled by Douglass’s criticism of the
Supreme Court’s decision in the Civil Rights Cases to hold unconstitutional key provisions
of the Civil Rights Act of 1875.  These provisions guaranteed people nondiscriminatory
access to inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public
amusement.  Douglass charged the Court with “admit[ting] that a State shall not abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, but commit[ting] the seeming
absurdity of allowing the people of a State to do what it prohibits the State itself from
doing.”  Frederick Douglass, Speech at the Mass-Meeting Held at Lincoln Hall: The Civil
Rights Case (Oct. 22, 1883), in 4 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS: RECON-
STRUCTION AND AFTER 392, 400 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1955).
80 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 109 (Fields, J., dissenting).
81 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
82 See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 522 n.1 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Legal
scholars agree on little beyond the conclusion that the [Privileges or Immunities] Clause
does not mean what the Court said it meant in 1873.”).
83 See GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, THE HEART OF THE CONSTITUTION: HOW THE BILL OF
RIGHTS BECAME THE BILL OF RIGHTS 6 (2018); Michael J. Douma, How the First Ten Amend-
ments Became the Bill of Rights, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 609–611 (2017) (finding that
“Bill of Rights” became defined as the first ten amendments by the late 1920s and early
1930s); Pauline Maier, The Strange History of the Bill of Rights, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 497,
506–511 (2017) (finding that the “Bill of Rights” did not emerge as an icon until the
1930s).
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used the phrase, “the bill of rights,” twenty-first-century scholars cannot be
certain exactly what they meant by it without more context.  Claims by Bing-
ham and others that the Privileges or Immunities Clause would apply “the
bill of rights” to the states must be handled with care.  In addition, it is useful
to rebut charges made by Raoul Berger, Charles Fairman, and other scholars
of the Fourteenth Amendment that Bingham was confused and not particu-
larly bright because he said that Article IV, Section 2 was part of “the bill of
rights.”84
Back then, no one necessarily meant what we mean today when speaking
of “the Bill of Rights.”  For example, when explaining his proposal to give
Congress the power to enforce “all privileges and immunities of citizens in
the several States, and to all persons in the several States equal protection in
the rights of life, liberty, and property,”85 Bingham noted that “[e]very word
of the proposed amendment is to-day in the Constitution of our country, save
the words conferring the express grant of power upon the Congress of the
United States.”86  After quoting both Article IV, Section 2, and the Fifth
Amendment, he referred to them as “these great provisions of the Constitu-
tion, this immortal bill of rights embodied in the Constitution.”87
Lash asserts that Bingham’s use here of the term “bill of rights” to refer
to Article IV, Section 2 and the Fifth Amendment might have been
idiosyncratic.
Whether Bingham originally held an idiosyncratic view of the federal
Bill of Rights and later changed his mind, or whether he originally spoke
only rhetorically in an effort to emphasize the role Article IV played in obli-
gating the states to respect the federal Bill of Rights, makes no difference to
the enumerated-rights reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.88
In other words, Lash doesn’t know which it is and is just guessing.
Lash is also wrong on the merits.  It makes a big difference whether
Bingham and others understood “the bill of rights” to encompass only a pair
of enumerated rights, all enumerated rights in the first eight amendments,
or all enumerated rights, full stop.  Only one of those understandings is con-
sistent with Lash’s distinctive thesis.
In his reply, Lash again quotes Bingham as saying his proposal “is simply
a proposition to arm the Congress of the United States, by the consent of the
people of the United States, with the power to enforce the bill of rights as it
84 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 182 (2d ed. 1997) (describing Bingham as a “careless, inaccu-
rate, stump speaker” who made “confused, contradictory utterances”); Charles Fairman,
Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN.
L. REV. 5, 26, 31 (1949) (describing Bingham as “befuddled,” “careless”).
85 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866).
86 Id. (statement of Rep. Bingham).
87 Id.
88 Lash, supra note 1, at 630.
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stands in the Constitution to-day.  It ‘hath that extent—no more.’”89  Lash
then says that “Bingham’s reference to the federal Bill of Rights would have
been understood as a reference to rights enumerated in the 1791 amend-
ments.”90  But if the meaning of a word (or phrase) is its use in language91
and “the bill of rights” was not conventionally used to denote the first eight
amendments, then we do not know this to be true.  And, as Lash grudgingly
acknowledges, Bingham himself used the term “bill of rights” to refer to Arti-
cle IV, which was enacted in 1789.
If Maier, Magliocca, and Douma are correct that there was no standard
usage, then Bingham’s use was not idiosyncratic.  In our article we reprised
what Magliocca says a “bill of rights” generally meant: a declaration of rights,
usually found at the head of a constitution.  Why does this matter?
We raised this issue in our critique because, in his scholarship, Lash
repeatedly uses quotes with the term “the bill of rights” to suggest to his mod-
ern readers these speakers were all referring to the first eight or ten amend-
ments as we would today, when in fact they were referring to a variety of sets
of rights—including the “privileges and immunities” protected by Article IV,
Section 2.  We also granted that this was an understandable mistake both for
him and his readers to make before the revisionist scholarship existed.  It is
far less understandable for Lash to continue to insist upon it now.
CONCLUSION
For all the focus on the trees it is important not to lose sight of the
forest.  This is a debate about what other protections citizens enjoy as citizens
under the Privileges or Immunities Clause over and apart from what they
enjoy as persons under the Due Process of Law Clause and the Equal Protec-
tion of the Laws Clause.  In particular, it is a debate over whether the Four-
teenth Amendment protects the fundamental rights identified in Corfield v.
Coryell and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, both absolutely and against
discrimination.
Lash now concedes these rights are protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.  The debate is over how.  Lash contends that these rights are only pro-
tected from discrimination by the Due Process of Law Clause and Equal
Protection of the Laws Clause.  States may deprive their citizens of these fun-
damental rights provided they deprive all their citizens equally.  We contend
that these are protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause in the same
manner as the rights enumerated in first eight amendments.
But in either case, all these rights are “enumerated” in Lash’s (some-
times) sense of the word insofar as their protection is expressly authorized by
89 Id. (quoting Cong. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Bingham)).
90 Id.
91 See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 43, at 25 (P.M.S.
Hacker & Joachim Schulte eds., G.E.M. Anscombe et al. trans., Wiley-Blackwell Publishing,
rev. 4th ed. 2009) (1953).
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the original meaning of the text of the Constitution—properly interpreted.
Recall, Lash insists Article IV, Section 2 is itself an enumerated right of
sojourning citizens, and with respect to sojourners the “privileges and immu-
nities” to which it referred are protected by the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  So do we.
The disagreement is now over the scope of its protection.  On Lash’s
understanding of “enumerated rights,” the “privileges and immunities” to
which Article IV refers are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment only
from discrimination when American citizens are sojourning in other states.
We think the Fourteenth Amendment also protects American citizens from
discrimination by their own states, as well as from when their states abridge
the rights of all their citizens equally.  But the set of rights being protected—which
includes the personal guarantees of the first eight amendments as well— is the
same on both accounts.
Our article was intended as a critique of Kurt Lash’s theory of the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause.  Notwithstanding his lengthy rebuttal, we believe
that Lash has still not proven his case.  Serious questions, concerns, and
problems with Lash’s theory remain unresolved.  In future work, we will
advance additional evidence on behalf of our reading of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause.
Our account will be deeply informed by the “republican” conception of
citizenship—a conception affirmed by the Citizenship Clause that precedes
it.  And we will show how the meaning and operation of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause fits together with the original meaning of the Due Process
of Law and Equal Protection of the Laws Clauses.  Finally, we will identify a
practical method for judges to identify the privileges or immunities of Ameri-
can citizenship that is grounded in our history and our traditions.
But this is merely a promissory note.  Before we could deliver on this
promise we needed to explain exactly why, not only scholars, but public offi-
cials and ordinary citizens need a better theory of the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause than the one provided by Kurt Lash.
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